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NOTES AND COMMENTS
READY-AIM-FIRE! - TIE SUPREME COURT
CONTINUES ITS ASSAULT ON THE WALL
OF SEPARATION IN ROSENBERGER
I. INTRODUCTION
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to
be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and
churches excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitu-
tion decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individ-
ual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while
some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be
drawn.'
Exactly where the line of separation between church and state is
to be drawn (if there is to be a line at all) has become a topic of much
debate.2 In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia,3 a sharply divided United States Supreme Court continued its
recent move towards dissolving this line in a case that involved a di-
rect conflict between the First Amendment's Free Speech and Reli-
gious Establishment Clauses 4
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy,5 stated that
the University of Virginia guidelines prohibiting the funding of Wide
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
2. See, eg., Betsey Boldt, McHenry County Church Craft Fair Raises Legal Questions At
School, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1995, at A3; Keith Epstein, Park Service Preacher Stirs Up Growing
Church/State Debate, ORErONiAN, Apr. 20, 1995, at A12; Isaac Kramnick, In Godless We Trust;
Why The Founding Fathers Created a Religion-Free Political Order, And Why We Shouldn't
Change It, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1996, at Cl; Clifford D. May, Church And State Republican
Majority Puts School Prayer, Vouchers Back On Congressional Table, RocKY MN. Niws, June
4, 1995, at A90; Jill Severn, Christian Right Isn't Alone In Spiritual Values, SEATtLE PosT-INTmL-
LiGrENCER, Mar. 17, 1995, at A15.
3. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
4. Id. 'The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares, in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion [Establishment Clause], or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof [Free Exercise Clause]." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, was directly joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2510. Justice O'Connor authored a
concurring opinion which was more narrowly drawn than the majority opinion. Id. at 2525
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Awake, a Christian newspaper created by students at the University of
Virginia,6 amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted
that such discrimination would not only undermine the purpose and
atiosphere of a university but would also violate the Free Speech
Clause.8 The possibility of direct funding for religious speech, in vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause, was dismissed by distinguishing
between a direct tax of the students and a mandatory student fee.9
The Court concluded that subsidizing the newspaper with mandatory
fees did not offend the Establishment Clause mandate.10
The Rosenberger decision represents another step in the Court's
recent move towards abolishing the wall of separation between church
and state.1 This Note argues that the Court's inadequate treatment
of several relevant issues in Rosenberger was motivated by a desire to
effectuate the decision it sought in order to continue this movement.
The Note focuses on the Establishment Clause concerns raised by the
Rosenberger decision. As such, the discussion of the Free Speech
principles presented in the case are limited in scope to their relevance
in understanding the decision of the Court. The Note begins with a
brief presentation of the Rosenberger facts and procedural history set
forth in Part II. An historical analysis of the Court's interpretation of
the phrase "establishment of religion" is discussed in Part III. The
decision of the Supreme Court in the Rosenberger case is then dis-
cussed in Part IV, followed by an analysis of the case in Part V. The
analysis focuses on three specific propositions: 1) the Court errone-
ously determined that the mandatory student fee was not equivalent
to a direct tax on the students and, therefore, the student fee did not
result in a direct subsidization of a religious activity; 2) the Court re-
fused to determine whether a student could demand a return of his or
her mandatory fee, because resolving that issue would have forced the
Court to conclude that Wide Awake was a religious entity and not
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he joined the
majority "in full," but authored the opinion to express his views on the history behind the Estab-
lishment Clause as a counter to the dissent's assertions. Id. at 2528 (Thomas, J., concurring). A
dissent written by Justice Souter was joined by Justices Ginsberg, Stevens, and Breyer. Id. at
2533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 2515. For a more detailed analysis of Wide Awake, see infra notes 14-21 and
accompanying text.
7. Id. at 2517. Viewpoint discrimination is directed against speech based on the ideas or
messages of the speaker. Id. If these views would normally be permissible within the forum,
then the discrimination is presumed impermissible. Id.
8. Id. at 2520.
9. Id. at 2522. For criticism of the Court's analysis of this issue see infra Part V(A).
10. Id. at 2524.
11. For a discussion of this recent move, see infra Part III(C).
[Vol. 31:533
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merely a student newspaper; and 3) the Court was unwilling to apply
the Lemon test12 to the Rosenberger case, reflecting the Court's con-
tinuing attempt to circumvent the constitutional mandate requiring a
separation of church and state.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Ronald W. Rosenberger and several other students at the Uni-
versity of Virginia 13 founded Wide Awake Productions (hereinafter
WAP), an organization established "[t]o facilitate discussion which
fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian
viewpoints.' 4 This objective was to be accomplished through a stu-
dent newspaper, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the Univer-
sity of Virginia.'5 The newspaper's mission was "to challenge
Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they pro-
claim and to encourage students to consider what a personal relation-
ship with Jesus Christ means."'16 The newspaper covered such topics
as racism, homosexuality, crisis pregnancy, missionary work, and eat-
ing disorders.' 7 It also contained professor interviews and Christian
music reviews.' 8 After discussing the platform of an issue, the articles
implored the reader to "satisfy a series of moral obligations derived
from the teachings of Jesus Christ."'19 A symbol of a cross was then
placed at the end of each article 20 Nearly all advertising in the paper
was by churches, Christian bookstores, and centers for Christian
study.21
12. The Lemon test is a standard established by the Supreme Court to determine whether a
governmental activity violates the First Amendment's prohibition on the establishment of reli-
gion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a more detailed description of the
Lemon test, see infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
13. The University of Virginia is recognized by state law as "the Rectors and Visitors of the
University of Virginia." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.





19. Id. at 2535. After a brief discussion on the secular aspects of bulimia and anorexia, in an
article dealing with eating disorders, the author stated:
As thinking people who profess a belief in God, we must grasp firmly the truth, the
reality of who we are because of Christ. Christ is the Bread of Life (John 6:35). Through
Him, we are full. He alone can provide the ultimate source of spiritual fulfillment which
permeates the emotional, psychological, and physical dimensions of our lives.
Id. at 2535.
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The University's policy required full-time students to pay $14 per
semester into a Student Activities Fund (SAF).1 A Student Council,
elected by the full student body, had authority to disburse these funds
to all eligible Contracted Independent Organizations (CIOs) related
to the educational purpose of the University.2 3 CIO status was
awarded to any student organization managed by officers who were
full-time students and who followed certain procedural require-
ments.24 These requirements included filing a constitution, notifying
all third parties with whom the CIOs dealt that they were not affili-
ated with the University, and not discriminating for membership pur-
poses.25 The CIOs were also required to sign an agreement that the
privileges they received through the University "should not be misin-
terpreted as meaning that those organizations are part of or controlled
by the University, that the University is responsible for the organiza-
tions' contracts or other acts or omissions, or that the University ap-
proves of the organizations' goals or activities."2 6
CIOs could submit a request for funds from the SAF, but not all
requests would be granted. 2 7 Examples of activities that were ex-
pressly prohibited from receiving funds included "religious activities,
philanthropic contributions and activities, political activities, activities
that would jeopardize the University's tax exempt status, those which
involve payment of honoraria or similar fees, or social entertainment
or related expenses. '28 The school defined a religious activity as "any
activity that 'primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or
about a deity or an ultimate reality'."2 9 There were eleven categories
that could have received funds, among which were "student news, in-
formation, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications me-
dia groups. '' 0




26. Id. Among the privileges given to CIOs is the use of the University's computers, meet-
ing rooms, and other facilities, as well as possible funding for various activities. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The prohibition on political activities is limited to lobbying and electioneering. Id. It
is not intended to precluded funding for unpopular or generally unaccepted ideological view-
points. Id. at 2514-2515.
29. Id. at 2515.
30. Id. at 2514.
[Vol. 31:533
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WAP applied, and was granted, status as a CIO.3' After accumu-
lating $5,862 in printing costs for Wide Awake, WAY applied for stu-
dent funding from the SAF.32 The Appropriations Committee of the
Student Council denied the request, noting the newspaper was a reli-
gious activity.3 3 WAP appealed to the full Student Council and was
again denied funding.3 4 Finally, WAP took their grievance to the Uni-
versity's last level of appeal, the Student Activities Committee. The
denial of funding was upheld in a letter by the Dean of Students.36
After exhausting all avenues of appeal at the university level, WAP
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia.37
B. The Rosenberger Decision
The United States District Court granted summary judgment for
the University.38 The court reasoned the denial of funds was not a
violation of free speech, but rather was legitimately based on the con-
stitutional mandate of neutrality between religion and the state and
the University's limited monetary resources.39 Furthermore, the Uni-
versity's Establishment Clause concerns were reasonable, therefore
justifying denial of funds to WAP.40 On appeal, the District Court's
31. Id. at 2515.
32. Id. During the 1991 school year, 135 of the eligible 343 CIOs at the university applied
for SAF funding, with 118 of these organizations actually receiving funds. Id.
33. Id. Rosenberger acknowledged at trial that Wide Awake was a publication written
"from a 'religious perspective."' Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F.
Supp. 175, 177 n.3 (W.D. Va. 1992).
34. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515. On appeal to the full Student Council, WAP contended
that refusal of the funds was a violation of their constitutional rights. Id.
35. Id. The Student Activities Committee is chaired by the Vice President of Student Af-
fairs, and is comprised of members of the faculty body. Id. at 2514.
36. Id. at 2515.
37. Id. at 2515-2516. WAP alleged that denial of funding violated their freedom of press,
freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection under the United States Con-
stitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). Id. at 2516. § 1983 states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any State.. .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding or redress.
38. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175 (W.D. Va.
1992), affd, 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
39. Id. at 180-181.
40. Id. at 181. The District Court, relying on Rosenberger's arguments, noted that Rosen-
berger was asserting the idea that publishing Wide Awake constituted a religious practice. Id. at
183 n.10.
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ruling was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.41 The court held that deny-
ing funds for speech dealing with a religious activity, but not other
speech, amounted to discrimination.42 The court continued by stating
the only defense that would justify this discrimination was a compel-
ling state interest.43 The court determined that direct subsidization of
the paper would result in the University becoming excessively entan-
gled in religious activities in violation of the Establishment Clause,
thus the University had met the burden of showing a compelling state
interest.44 The court also stated the University afforded the members
of WAP the same privileges granted to all other CIOs, including the
publication of Wide Awake.45 Funding, however, could not be pro-
vided for Wide Awake because of the excessive religious entangle-
ment.' WAP, therefore, was not unfairly singled out by the
University.47
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the University of Virginia's regulations prohibiting funding of
WAP denied WAP's right to free speech, and, if so, whether the Uni-
versity was justified in its denial by the Establishment Clause. 8
III. DEFINING THE "ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION"
A. Early Modern Interpretation
The first modem United States Supreme Court case to examine
the limitations of what constitutes an "establishment of religion" was
Everson v. Board of Education.49 Everson concerned a New Jersey
statute which allowed a board of education to reimburse parents of
children who used public transportation to attend school.50 Some of
41. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
42. Id. at 281.
43. Id. A compelling state interest requires the strictest judicial scrutiny upon review.
"[W]hen government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum,
the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial
state interests." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
44. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 286.
45. Id. at 285.
46. Id. at 288.
47. See hi.
48. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994).
49. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
50. Id. at 3. The statute stated, in relevant part, "any district [where] there are children
living remote from any schoolhouse, the board of education... may make rules and contracts
for the transportation of such children to and from school, including.., to and from school other
than a public school." NJ. RExV. STAT. § 14-8 (1941).
[Vol. 31:533
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this money was disbursed to parents who sent their children to paro-
chial schools.51 The vast majority of these schools instructed the stu-
dents in both secular and religious ideas.' Everson, a New Jersey
taxpayer, filed suit alleging the statute violated both the state and Fed-
eral constitutional prohibition against an establishment of religion.53
Writing for a sharply divided Court, Justice Black stated that the reli-
gion clause established:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organi-
zations or groups and vice versa.54
He continued by noting that the First Amendment requires the state
to be neutral with both religious believers and non-believers.5 5 Fur-
thermore, he stated that it was not a violation of the First Amendment
to reimburse parents who sent their children to parochial schools, so
long as the schools met New Jersey's educational requirements. 6 He
concluded that the First Amendment has erected a "high and impreg-
nable" wall between church and state, and-this statute did not violate
this separation.57
Fifteen years later, the United States Supreme Court began more
fully defining the parameters of what constituted a violation of this
"wall of separation" between church and state and an establishment
of religion.5 8 In Engel v. Vitale,59 the Board of Regents, an agency
created by the New York Constitution, was given broad powers over
the State's public schools. 60 Under the Regents' "Statement on Moral
51. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3-5.
54. Id. at 15-16.
55. Id. at 18.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
59. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
60. Id. at 422-423.
1996]
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and Spiritual Training in the Schools," the Board initiated a
mandatory school prayer recitation in every class on each day of
school. 61  Parents of ten New York school children brought suit
against the State Board of Regents to prevent the continuation of the
mandatory prayer.62 The parents contended the reading was a viola-
tion of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.63 The Supreme
Court agreed, declaring "an establishment of religion must at least
mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to re-
cite as a part of a religious program carried on by government."'
One year later, the Court reaffirmed this position in School Dis-
trict of Abington v. Schempp,65 when it struck down both a Penn-
sylvania and Maryland law mandating readings from the Bible and
recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each school day.66
Analyzing the "purpose" and "primary effect" of the enactment, the
Court stated that for a law "to withstand the strictures of the Estab-
lishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion., 67 Applying
this rule, the Court determined that the readings constituted a "reli-
gious activity" mandated by State law, and was in violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause.68
61. Id. at 423. The prayer the students were required to recite was "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
62. Id. at 423.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 425. The Court focused on the historical relationship between church and state in
recognizing:
[T]he Establishment Clause ... rested on the belief that a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. The history of govern-
mentally established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that when-
ever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable
result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those
who held contrary beliefs.
Id. at 431.
65. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The decision was based on the compilation of two cases in which
the parents of children attending schools in Maryland and Pennsylvania brought action against
each state to end compulsory bible reading sessions in the respective school districts. Id. at 203.
66. Id. at 205. The Pennsylvania law required that "[a]t least ten verses from the Holy Bible
shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day." Id.
The Maryland rule required, in relevant part, "reading, without comment, of a chapter in the
Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer," each school day. Id. at 211.
67. Id. at 222.
68. Id. at 223. Five years after the Schempp decision, the Court would again use the same
standard of analyzing the "purpose" and "primary effect" of a New York Statute in determining
a law requiring the purchase and loaning of non-sectarian textbooks to students attending paro-
chial schools did not violate the Establishment Clause. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968).
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B. The Turning Point
After the Engel and Schempp decisions, the Court began devel-
oping a more expansive definition for interpreting the Establishment
Clause. It moved away from its hard-line approach to defining the
"establishment of religion" and toward a less separationist stance.69
This move marked a drastic change in the Court's jurisprudence deal-
ing with religion. 0
In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York,71 the Court
continued the use of the "purpose" and "primary effect" tests in de-
termining what constituted an "establishment of religion" by implying
an additional element of "excessive government entanglement with
religion. '72 In Walz, a property owner sued the New York Tax Com-
mission seeking an injunction to prohibit the Commission from grant-
ing property tax exemptions to religious organizations for land used
strictly for religious worship.73 In rejecting this claim, the Court ap-
plied this "new" approach and determined that the purpose of the
exemption neither inhibited nor promoted religion.74 The Court fur-
ther stated that the exemption did create some government involve-
ment, but the involvement was only minimal and remote.75 The Court
concluded by stating that "it is an essential part of adjudication to
draw distinctions, including fine ones, in the process of interpreting
the Constitution." 76 The Court fully adopted the standard created in
Walz for dealing with the Establishment Clause one year later.77
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,7s the Court firmly acknowledged a three-
prong standard that was to be used in analyzing cases dealing with the
Establishment Clause.79 The three "prongs" that were required for a
69. GREGG IVERS, LOWERING THE WALL: RELIGION AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
1980s 3 (1991).
70. ld. at 2-3.
71. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
72. Id. at 674.
73. Id. at 666.
74. ld. at 672. The Court specifically focused on the historical roots of tax exemptions to
churches. ld. at 673. The Court determined that it was far better to offer an exemption to a
church, rather than to directly tax a church; the latter could lead to an excessively entangled
relationship between church and state. ld. at 673-74.
75. Ld. at 676. To counter the dissent's assertion that this tax exemption would create an
establishment of religion, the Court stated, "[i]f tax exemption can be seen as this first step
toward 'establishment' of religion... the second step has been long in coming." Id. at 678.
76. Id. at 679. For an informative analysis of tax exemptions for religion, see Boris I. Bitt-
ker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 78-85.
78. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
79. Id. at 612-13.
1996]
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law to be declared constitutional were: (1) the law's legislative pur-
pose must be secular in nature; (2) the law must not have the primary
effect of inhibiting or advancing religion; and (3) the law must not
result in an excessive entanglement between church and state."0 In
applying this standard, the Court concluded that both a Rhode Island
statute and a Pennsylvania statute providing aid to church-related
schools were in violation of the First Amendment.8 ' The Court em-
phasized that "parochial schools involve substantial religious activity
and purpose."' ' 2 Thus, these schools would require continuous surveil-
lance because ignoring teachers who were under "religious control"
would be dangerous.8 3 This continuous surveillance would then result
in a violation of the excessive entanglement element of the "test."8 4
Therefore, the statute violated the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause.85
On the same day the Court decided Lemon it also handed down
the Tilton v. Richardson86 decision, which expanded the rule on reli-
gious involvement in applying the three elements of the standard de-
veloped in Lemony.8 Four church-related universities applied and
received construction grants under The Higher Education Facilities
Act of 1963.88 The Act offered federal grants to colleges provided
they did not use the facilities for sectarian instruction, religious wor-
ship, or any other activity that might be directly connected with a
school of divinity, for twenty years.89 In beginning its analysis, the
80. Id
81. Id. at 607-11. The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act provided that salaries of school
teachers who taught secular subjects at private schools be supplemented up to 15%. Id. at 607.
This included 250 teachers at parochial schools. Id. at 608. Pennsylvania's Non-Public Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act authorized the reimbursement of teacher's salaries, text-
books, and other materials used in the teaching of specific secular subjects at parochial schools.
Id.
82. Id. at 616.
83. See id. at 618-19.
84. Id. at 619. The Court asserted that "state inspection and evaluation of the religious
content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution
forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive governmental direction of church
schools and hence of churches." Id. at 620.
85. Id. at 625.
86. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
87. Id. at 682-89.
88. Id. at 674. The four universities that had received assistance were: 1) Sacred Heart
University which had used the funds to build a library; 2) Annhurst College which constructed a
music, drama, and arts building; 3) Fairfield University which built both a library and a science
building; and 4) Albertus Magnus College which used the funds for a language library. Id. at
676.
89. Id. at 675.
[Vol. 31:533
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Court stated there could be no specific standard upon which each ele-
ment would be measured. 90 The Court further stated that the entire
Lemon test should only be viewed as a guideline for resolving conflicts
with the Religion Clauses91 and not as an absolute boundary. 2 The
Court first held the twenty-year limitation was in violation of the Con-
stitution, because the schools could use the property, after the twenty
years, for any purpose they wanted.93 This would amount to a federal
grant that, in the future, may advance religion. 94 The Court did not
invalidate the Act for this reason, but continued its analysis noting
that there were three reasons the Act did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.95 First, the colleges' primary purposes were not reli-
gious indoctrination; therefore, it was less likely that secular and
religious teachings would become interrelated.96 Furthermore, the
government was providing facially neutral aid to the colleges.97 Fi-
nally, a single-purpose, one-time grant greatly reduced the possibility
of government entanglement with religion.98 The Court concluded
with the notion that no one of the three factors in this application was
controlling, and collectively they resulted in a "narrow and limited re-
lationship with government."99 The Court severed the twenty-year
limitation section from the Act and declared the remaining parts con-
stitutionally valid. 1°° This process of severing sections from a statute
that violated the Establishment Clause, without invalidating the entire
law, would continue to be used by the Court after the Tilton
decision.' 0'
90. Id. at 677.
91. Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, U.S. CONrST. amend. 1. See descrip-
tions supra note 4.
92. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 678.
93. Id. at 683.
94. Id. at 683.
95. Id. at 687-88.
96. Id. at 687.
97. Id. at 687-88.
98. Id. at 688.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 689. The Court stated "It]he unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not
necessarily defeat.., the validity of its remaining provisions." Id. at 684 (quoting Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
101. See also Wolman v. Walters 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (finding the use of public money to non-
public schools for the purchase and loaning of secular textbooks, use of a test scoring system,
and providing therapeutic services was within Constitutional limits, while money used for field
trips and other instructional materials at non-public schools violated the Establishment Clause);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding provisions of a Pennsylvania statute which au-
thorized the loaning of secular textbooks to non-public schools did not offend the Constitution,
while other provisions providing counseling, therapy, and other instructional material to non-
public schools violated the Establishment Clause).
1996]
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In Lemon, Chief Justice Burger noted "in constitutional adjudica-
tion some steps, which when taken were thought to approach 'the
verge,' have become the platform for yet further steps. A certain mo-
mentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a 'downhill
thrust' easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop."' ' 2 Once
this process was set in motion, the Court would continue to gradually
hammer away at the wall of separation between church and state, de-
stroying the separationist principles established in previous deci-
sions.'03 Ironically, it was Chief Justice Burger who wrote all three
majority opinions which began the initial erosion of the "wall" and
which resulted in this "downhill thrust."
C. A New Direction
The Court's new direction in religious jurisprudence was notably
highlighted in Widmar v. Vincent.'°4 Eleven students who attended
the University of Missouri at Kansas City brought suit against the
University charging a violation of their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 05 The students chal-
lenged a 1972 University regulation that prohibited the University's
buildings from being used "for purposes of religious worship or reli-
gious teaching.' 0 6 The Court began by declaring that the University
was a public forum. 0 7 In order to justify discriminatory restrictions
on religious activities in a public forum, the University must show "a
102. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).
103. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (holding a Maryland
statute that provided noncategorical grants to four Roman Catholic Church affiliated colleges
did not violate the Establishment Clause); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (applying the
Lemon test to determine a South Carolina Act providing a Baptist-controlled college with reve-
nue bonds did not violate the Establishment Clause). But see Committee for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (holding a New York statute which provided
for tuition reimbursement grants and income tax benefits to parents of children attending non-
public schools, and maintenance and repair grants to non-public schools violated the Establish-
ment Clause).
104. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
105. 1d. at 266. The students were members of an evangelical Christian organization named
Cornerstone. Id. at 265 n.2.
106. Id. at 265. From 1973 to 1977 the University permitted the members of Cornerstone to
regularly use the University's buildings for meetings. Id. These meetings included prayer ses-
sions, religious discussions, Bible commentary, and hymns. Id. at 265 n.2. In 1977, the group was
informed they could no longer meet in the University buildings pursuant to University regula-
tions. Id.
107. Id. at 267-268. A limited public forum is created when the state opens a facility for
public speech or expression, but limits its use in order to preserve the primary purpose of the
forum. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981). The Court has generally recognized a
university as a limited public forum, restricted only in furtherance of its primary mission towards
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compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end."' 8 In applying the Lemon test, the Court determined that an
"equal access" policy for religious organizations would not violate the
Establishment Clause.10 9 Specifically focusing on the "primary effect"
element, the Court stated that incidental benefits were not incompati-
ble with the prohibition against advancing religion.110 The University,
therefore, had to allow religious organizations equal access to Univer-
sity facilities. 111 The Court concluded that allowing religious organi-
zations access to open forums at the University would not "confer any
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices."" 2
In Marsh v. Chambers,"3 the Court continued tearing down the
"wall of separation" by holding that the Nebraska Legislature's prac-
tice of opening each session with a prayer by a chaplain paid with
public funds did not violate the Establishment Clause." 4 Noticeably
avoiding the Lemon test, the Court analyzed the Establishment
Clause issue from an historical perspective. 1' 5 Acknowledging histori-
cal patterns of Congressional approval of payment to chaplains for
these services, the Court concluded that "opening legislative sessions
with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.""' 6 By not
applying a formal standard or test to this issue, the Court effectively
education. Id. For a detailed analysis of the public forum, see Robert C. Post, Between Govern-
ance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rav. 1713
(1987).
108. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270. In this case, the compelling state interest related to the Estab-
lishment Clause provisions in the Federal and Missouri Constitutions. Id.
109. Id. at 271.
110. Id. at 273. The Court accepted the District Court's and Court of Appeals' conclusions
that the "secular purpose" and "excessive entanglement" elements were properly satisfied. Id.
at 271-72.
111. See id. at 273-74. The Court did mention, however, that the University could still ex-
clude activities in violation of the First Amendment if their exclusion was reasonably related to
maintaining a campus atmosphere conducive to education. Id. at 276-77 (citing Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 175 (1972)).
112. Id. at 274.
113. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
114. Id. at 791-94. The chaplain for the Nebraska legislature was of Presbyterian faith, and
had served as chaplain for 16 years. Id. at 793. All of his prayers were recited and fashioned in
the Judeo-Christian tradition. Id.
115. Id. at 786. Both the Court of Appeals and the dissent applied the Lemon test and
determined that all three elements had failed the test, and therefore concluded that the Estab-
lishment Clause had been violated. Id. at 786, 800-01.
116. Id. at 792. The Court noted that the First Congress had considered the election of a
House and Senate chaplain an important task during its first session. Id. at 787-88. It also recog-
nized that a challenge to the chaplaincy in the 1850's was unsuccessful, and a majority of states
now begin each legislative session with prayer. Id. at 788-89 nn.10-11.
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carved out an exception to the Establishment Clause without directly
reshaping this doctrine. 17
In Lynch v. Donnelly,"8 the Court moved even further away
from the separationist views of the past." 9 The city of Pawtucket,
Rhode Island had erected a Christmas display in a centrally-located
park, owned by a non-profit organization, every year for over forty
years.' 20 Among the decorations was a nativity scene that included
the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and ani-
mals.' 2 1 Residents of the city sued to have the scene excluded from
the annual display.'" The Court began its analysis by arguing that the
"wall of separation" was a nice metaphor, but inaccurate in its de-
scription of the relationship between church and state. 123 The Court
further noted that the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accom-
modation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility
towards any."'1 24 The Court went on to state this issue should be ana-
lyzed in terms of its context in the Christmas season. 25 Under this
analysis, the Court noted that the scene does advance religion in a
sense, but prior decisions realize that this will occasionally happen.'26
In this particular case, the relationship was "indirect, remote, and inci-
dental."' 27 Consequently, the city had not violated the Establishment
Clause with the display of the nativity scene.128
The most recent case to highlight this trend away from the sepa-
rationist views of the past is Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School
District.'29 An Evangelical church wanted to show a six-part film se-
ries about instilling traditional Christian values to children at a young
117. See id. at 795-96. The Court justified this exception by stating, "[t]o invoke Divine gui-
dance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'estab-
lishment' of religion or a step towards establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of
beliefs widely held among the people of this country." Id. at 792.
118. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 671.
121. Id. The nativity scene originally cost the city $1,365, but is now valued at only $200. Id.
It requires approximately $20 to dismantle and erect the scene each year, plus nominal costs for
lighting. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 673.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 679. The Court refused to apply any "rigid" test noting, "[in our modem, com-
plex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity
and pluralism in all areas, an absolutionist approach in applying the Establishment Clause is
simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court." Id. at 678.
126. Id. at 683.
127. Id.
128. Id at 684-85.
129. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
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age. 130 The school district denied the request noting the films violated
section 414 of the New York Education Law.' 3' The church then
brought suit against the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
a violation of free speech, assembly, and freedom of religion. 32 The
Court began by finding the prohibition on access to the school's prem-
ises resulted in viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment. 33 The Court continued by noting that this may be per-
missible if allowing the speech into the school would result in an es-
tablishment of religion.'3 Returning to the Lemon test, behind sharp
criticism, 35 the Court found that all three elements were satisfied and
there would be no misconceptions that the school district was directly
endorsing these religious beliefs.' 36 The Court therefore held that the
school district had violated Lamb's Chapel's First Amendment speech
rights.137
Since Widmar, the Court has generally favored a more accom-
modationist approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 31
There have been a few exceptions over the last decade, but none have
slowed down this rapidly evolving trend. 39 The Rosenberger decision
accentuates the Court's continuing commitment towards abolishing
"the wall of separation."
130. Id. at 2144.
131. Id. at 2144-45. Section 414 of the New York Education Law gave local school boards
the authority to adopt regulations on the use of school facilities. Id. at 2143. Religious activities
were expressly forbidden while "social, civic, and recreational meetings" were permitted. Id. at
2143-44. The school district issued ten rules in accordance with this Act; Rule 7 expressly prohib-
ited school premises to be used for religious purposes. Id. at 2145.
132. Id at 2145. The church conceded to the District Court that the presentation of the film
series was for religious purposes. Id.
133. Id. at 2147-48.
134. Id. at 2148.
135. Id. at 2149-50. (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's citation of Lemon... is unset-
tling and unnecessary"); "I agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized
Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and waver-
ing shapes its intermittent use has produced." Id. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2148.
137. Id. The Court declined to address the issue of whether the rule excluding the property
from being used for religious purposes was hostile to religion. Id. at 2146 n.4.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 113-137.
139. Compare School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Bali, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding
a Michigan school program that financed classes for non-public school students with public funds
had the "primary effect" of advancing religion) and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (apply-
ing the Lemon test to an Alabama statute authorizing a one minute period of silence for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer in schools, the Court ruled the statute violated the Establishment
Clause) with Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (hold-
ing a Christian club could not be denied equal access to a school's facilities based on the religious
content of the speech at their meetings) and Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986) (ruling a Washington state statute that provided governmental assistance for
a blind man to attend a private Christian college did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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IV. DECISION OF THE CASE
Before addressing the Establishment Clause concerns in Rosen-
berger, the Supreme Court first decided the free speech issue that was
presented. 40 Relying on precedent, the Court noted that any form of
discrimination based on the views or message of a speaker in a public
forum was generally unconstitutional. 141 An exception to this rule ex-
isted if the discrimination was used as a means of preserving the fo-
rum."4 2 In order to determine whether the discrimination was
permissible, the Court first defined the concepts of content and view-
point discrimination. 143 In accordance with Lamb's Chapel, the Court
disagreed with the defendant's contention that the University's guide-
lines were based on content and not viewpoint discrimination.'" The
Court began by stating the line between content and viewpoint dis-
crimination was not easily discernable. 145 The Court continued that,
like the rejection of the school facilities in Lamb's Chapel based on
the religious perspective of the group and not the subject matter of its
speeches, the SAF guidelines also discriminated against WAP based
on its editorial perspective, not the content of the magazine. 46 The
Court concluded by stating that there can be viewpoint discrimination
even where the entire class of religious viewpoints is discriminated
140. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1995).
141. Id. The Court reasoned that the SAF represented a forum "in a metaphysical than in a
spatial or geographical sense," yet the same principles of forum analysis applied. Id. at 2517.
142. Id. at 2516-17. The Court has generally recognized that a university's primary purpose
is to provide education to its students. A university, therefore, may regulate or discriminate
against the free speech rights of individuals if it substantially impairs the school's ability to teach.
linker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-14 (1969).
143. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517. Content discrimination is based on speech and may be
permissible if the discrimination supports and preserves the goal and purpose of the forum. Id.
Viewpoint discrimination is directed against speech based on the ideas or messages of the
speaker. Id. at 2516. If these views would normally be permissible within the forum, then the
discrimination is presumed impermissible. Id. at 2517.
144. Id.
145. Id. Obviously the Court's attempt to draw this distinction proved more confusing than
it believed. The Court conceded:
It is, in a sense, something of an understatement to speak of religious thought and
discussion as just a viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of thought. The
nature of our origins and destiny and their dependence upon the existence of a divine
being have been subjects of philosophic inquiry throughout human history.
Id.
The Court then remarkably concluded the University rejection of funds to Wide Awake
amounted to viewpoint discrimination. Id.
146. Id.
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against. 4 7 All debate is not bi-polar, therefore, any exclusion results
in some form of viewpoint discrimination. 148
Furthermore, the Court struck down the University's contention
that the scarcity of money differs from the availability of physical fa-
cilities, so funding of speech should differ from access to facilities. 49
The Court stated that regardless of the supply or demand of scarce
resources, there was no acceptable excuse for viewpoint discrimina-
tion.1 50 The University was still required to allocate scarce resources
on "neutral principle[s]."' 5'1 If the University was permitted to use
this as an excuse, it could selectively choose the ideas that would be
expressed and effectively suppress thoughts and opinions that were
contrary to its beliefs.' 52 This would undermine the very purpose of
the University - a setting for evolving philosophy and thought. 53
Based on these findings, the Court concluded the University had
violated WAP's First Amendment free speech rights. 54 After this
finding, the Court proceeded to examine whether this violation was
justified because of compliance with the Establishment Clause. 55
The Court began its Establishment Clause analysis with the gen-
eral principle that all governmental programs should be facially neu-
tral to religion. 56 All criteria and policies should be fashioned so that
decision making is done evenhandedly between competing interests,
with religion exempt as a factor for consideration. 5 7 The Court then
147. Id. at 2518.
148. Id. In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that viewpoint discrimination, according to pre-
cedent, did not encompass the vast interpretation the majority set forth. Id. at 2548 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). He stated that the concept of viewpoint discrimination is more narrowly drawn. Id.
Viewpoint discrimination occurs when "government allows one message while prohibiting the
messages of those who can reasonably be expected to respond," not when it excludes an entire
class or subject of speech altogether. Id. at 2548-49.
149. Id. at 2518.
150. Id. at 2518-19.
151. Id. at 2519.
152. Id. at 2520. The Court noted that "[t]he first danger to liberty lies in granting the State
the power to examine publications to determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate
idea and if so for the State to classify them." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2520-21.
156. Id. at 2521.
157. Id. Justice Souter's dissent disagreed with the expansive interpretation of this policy,
arguing:
[W]henever affirmative government aid ultimately benefits religion, the Establishment
Clause requires some justification beyond evenhandedness on the government's part;
and that direct public funding of core sectarian activities, even if accomplished pursuant
to an evenhanded program, would be entirely inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause and would strike at the very heart of the Clause's protection.
Id. at 2540 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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determined the SAF program was facially neutral.15 8 After making
this determination, the Court explained why it believed the
mandatory student fee was not a tax.' 59 The fee represented the need
and purpose of a university to promote divergent speech, not support
specific religious sects or raise revenue for the University. 60 As such,
the expenditure of these funds, in a religion-neutral program, is per-
missible.' 6 ' The Court continued that payment to a third-party con-
tractor furthered the separation between the University and Wide
Awake, diminishing the possibility of entanglement. 62 It concluded
that any imposition of censorship on religious speech would not only
violate the University's commitment towards fostering an atmosphere
for diverse views, but may lead to deprivation of Constitutional
rights.' 63
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Mandatory Student Fee - Forced Taxation
James Madison is generally acknowledged as the author of the
First Amendment Religion Clauses.'6 As such, he not only under-
stood the need for religious freedom but also the importance of sepa-
ration of church and state.165 To the latter argument, he wrote his
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, which
158. Id. at 2522.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2522-23.
161. Id. at 2524. In making this assertion, the Court relied upon the reasoning expressed in
Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel. It stated that a contrary assumption to this belief would
effectively overrule all the cases. Id. at 2523.
162. Id. at 2524. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor defended payment to third-
party contractors asserting, "[t]his safeguard accompanying the University's financial assistance,
when provided to a publication with a religious viewpoint such as Wide Awake, ensures that the
funds are used only to further the University's purpose in maintaining a free and robust market-
place of ideas, from whatever perspective." Id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Sou-
ter, in his dissent, attacked the majority's assertion arguing payment to printers results in "new
economic benefits . being extended directly to religion in clear violation of the principle bar-
ring direct aid." Id. at 2546 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2524-25.
164. Michael W. McConnell, Taking Religious Freedom Seriously (1990), reprinted in REU.
GIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT: TiE CASES THAT DEnsIn THE DEBATE OVER CHURCH
AND STATE 497 (T. Eastland ed. 1993). In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas tried to down-
play some of Madison's separationist views set forth by the dissent stating, "[i]n any event, the
views of one man do not establish the original understanding of the First Amendment." Rosen-
berger, 115 S. Ct. at 2530. Ironically, much of Justice Thomas' opinion is based on lengthy quotes
from this "insignificant" source. Id. at 2529-30.
165. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice (1990), reprinted in
REuGIOus LIBERTY iN THE SUPREmE COURT- Tim CAsEs THAT DEF 1m THE DEBATE OVER
CHURCH AND STATE 483-96 (T. Eastland ed. 1993).
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consisted of fifteen arguments advocating a separation of church and
state. 166 This remonstrance amounted to both "the defeat of Vir-
ginia's tax assessment biU... [and the] passage of the Virginia Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom."' 67 With such a powerful mandate, it
is difficult to understand the Supreme Court's justification for the di-
rect funding of Wide Awake.
This justification was based, in large part, on the Court's errone-
ous rationalization that the mandatory student fee was not a tax;
therefore, the funding of Wide Awake was not governmentally fi-
nanced.168  The Court stated that the mandatory student fee repre-
sented an exaction upon the students for the use of facilitating "wide-
ranging speech and inquiry" at the University.169 As such, the exac-
tion was in compliance with the University's primary purpose of fos-
tering an educational setting for diverse views and opinions.170  It
concluded that the fee may be mandatory in nature, but the exaction
is not used to raise revenue for the University, so it can not be consid-
ered a "tax" within the general meaning of the term.' 71
The obvious flaw in this assertion is that the Court avoids ac-
knowledging that the "University exercises the power of the State to
compel a student to pay" money to support its primary purpose.172
166. ld. at 491-92. In relevant part, Madison stated:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion
of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Chris-
tians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785-86), reprinted
in THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 19-20 (Robert S. Alley ed. 1988).
167. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2536-37. Thomas Jefferson, in his Bill for Establishing Reli-
gious Freedom, stated, in relevant part:
[T]hat to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opin-
ions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical... [t]hat no man shall be compelled
to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever ... that the
rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind.
Thomas Jefferson, Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785-86), reprinted in THE SUPREME
COURT ON CHURCH A D STATE 25-26 (R. Alley ed. 1988). The Virginia tax assessment bill was
developed for "the support of clergy in the performance of their function of teaching religion."
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2528 (Thomas, J., concurring).
168. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. The Court stated "[a] tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in
the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the Government." Id. (quoting United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
172. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2538 (Souter, J., dissenting).
19
Bycroft: Ready--Aim--Fire--The Supreme Court Continues Its Assault on the
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
The University is a governmental body given its power by state law.173
As an entity of the state, any fee a person is compelled to pay and
which is used as a means to raise revenue to support the University's
mission is regarded as a tax. 74 In this case, the exaction is used to
support the primary purpose of the University - providing quality
education.175 To support this mission, the University initiated a pro-
gram that provided funding for organizations with the collection of a
mandatory student fee.176 The fee is mandatory since the students
have no recourse or means of objecting to it.177 The mandatory fee,
therefore, is directly correlated to the educational mission of the Uni-
versity, and is used as a means of raising revenue to support that pri-
mary purpose. It is apparent, therefore, that the mandatory student
fee is equivalent to a direct tax on the students. As a result, the stu-
dents are forced to support a religious activity in contradiction of the
mandate of the Establishment Clause. This coercion into financing
religious proselytization exposes an even greater flaw in the Court's
analysis, or lack thereof.
B. Swept Under the Rug - The Unresolved Issue
A disturbing issue left unresolved by the Court was whether a
student, under the First Amendment, could successfully require a re-
imbursement of his or her mandatory fee that was used for purposes
inconsistent with the student's beliefs.178 The Court declined to ad-
dress this issue, stating that it was not before the Court.179 A closer
examination of the implications resulting from an analysis of this issue
leaves the Court's denial highly suspect.
There currently exists a split among the lower courts over
whether such a claim would prevail.' One similarity among all of
these cases is their agreement that the relevant starting point for this
173. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 271 n.1 (4th Cir.
1994), rev'd 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
174. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 1.
175. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2538 n.3. (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2522.
179. Id. at 2522-23 ("The fee is mandatory, and we do not have before us the question
whether an objecting student has the First Amendment right to demand a prorata return to the
extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or she does not subscribe."); id. at 2527
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A]lthough the question is not presented here, I note the possibility
that the student fee is susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by an objecting student that
she should not be compelled to pay for speech with which she disagrees.").
180. Compare Hays v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 122 (5th Cir. 1992) (mandatory student fees
used to support student newspaper did not violate the First Amendment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
[Vol. 31:533
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss3/9
ROSENBERGER v. RECTOR
analysis is two Supreme Court cases, Abood v. Detroit Board of Edu-
cation s18 and Keller v. State Bar of California."'2 In Abood, the Court
addressed the issue of whether members of a union could withhold
mandatory membership dues that were being used for political and
ideological causes inconsistent with their own views.18 3 The Court, in
a unanimous opinion, held that as long as the dues were supporting
the primary purpose of the union, collective bargaining, then they
were valid.1 4 If they were used to support political or ideological be-
liefs inconsistent with the union's primary purpose, they would be un-
constitutional. 8 5 Specifically, the Court stated "that in a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather
than coerced by the State."'" The Court concluded by emphasizing
that an employee did not have to point to specific ideological causes
he opposed.' 7 He was only required to indicate opposition to any
expenditure that was contrary to the primary purpose of the union. 88
In Keller, the Court reaffirmed this position in a case challenging the
use of mandatory bar dues by the State Bar of California.189 Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the dues were valid
if used to promote the mission of the State Bar, but funding for ideo-
logical or political beliefs, with which the members disagreed, outside
this mission, was unconstitutional. 90 He emphasized that the dues
should not be used to "endorse or advance" goals or views contrary to
the primary purpose of the organization.' 9'
It may be asserted that the funded speech relates to the Univer-
sity's goal of providing a "marketplace of ideas,""9 therefore all views
should be funded. The only test used to determine whether the funded
speech falls into this "marketplace" is whether it is germane to the
1067 (1993) with Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500,516-17 (Cal. 1993) (Univer-
sity was required to provide a partial refund of mandatory student fee to students who objected
to the use of the fees for certain political or ideological views), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 181
(1993)).
181. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
182. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
183. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211.
184. ld. at 225-26.
185. Id. at 234.
186. Id. at 235.
187. Id. at 241.
188. Id.
189. Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
190. Id. at 14.
191. Id. at 16.
192. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). This concept refers to the diverse views,
opinions, philosophy, and beliefs that are an integral part of a college environment. Id.
1996]
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primary purpose of the University. 9 3 Since all diverse views are ger-
mane to a university's purpose of providing a culturally divergent at-
mosphere of education, no view should be excluded.
The problem with this argument is that this expansive interpreta-
tion lacks any real foundation, limitations, or support. This broad
proposition has long been discarded by the courts and replaced with a
balancing test that weighs the interests of the individual's speech and
association rights with that of the activity in question. 94 The Supreme
Court has stated that even incidental burdens on speech must be nar-
rowly drawn when dealing with compelled speech.195
Had the Court balanced these interests in Rosenberger, it would
have revealed the true religious character of Wide Awake. The news-
paper is not a forum for academic communication used to express
Christian news and information, but rather a religious activity with the
singular purpose of evangelism. 96 The Court would have been forced
to recognize the candidly religious nature of the newspaper that it
conveniently ignored in its opinion. The Court would have acknowl-
edged the mission statement signed "Love in Christ," the masthead on
193. See Carolyn Wiggin, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory
Student Fees to Support Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE LJ. 2009, 2014 (1994)
("If the funded speech is germane to the function served by the organization - that is, the func-
tion which justifies the government compelling individuals to fund the organization in the first
place - then the organization may use the compelled dues to fund the speech").
194. See Carroll v. Blinken, 42 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[E]ven activities that physically
occur on campus may not fulfill [State University of New York] Albany's educational objectives
and therefore should not be allocated to the Albany campus."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 300
(1992); Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1067 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[A] university's role of presenting
a variety of ideas is a sufficiently compelling reason for some infringement of First Amendment
rights .... [T]hat contention loses its force, however, when an outside organization independent
of a university and dedicated to advancing one position ... [compels] contributions from those
who are opposed."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 477 n.3
(4th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he extent of the abridgment is properly considered in striking the constitu-
tional balance between the educational goals of a state university and the speech and association
rights of its students."); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 150 (D. Neb. 1973) ("Whether
such activities in fact are educational in nature is for the Board of Regents to determine, subject
only to the limitations that the determination ... not have the effect of imposing upon the
student the acceptance or practice of religious, political, or personal views repugnant to him
.), affd, 478 F.2d 1407 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); Smith v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 508 (Cal. 1993) ("[T]he University's educational function is
extremely broad ... [B]y recognizing that student political activity can be 'germane' to education
we run the risk of sanctioning a much greater burden on speech and association rights than the
[C]ourt necessarily contemplated when it used that term."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993);
Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 542 P.2d 762,768 (Wash. 1975) ("[W]e must
balance the plaintiff's First Amendment rights against the traditional need and desirability of the
university to provide an atmosphere of learning, debate, dissent, and controversy.").
195. See Carroll v. Blinken, 975 F.2d 991, 999 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
196. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2535
(1995).
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each issue containing St. Paul's exhortation, the continuous calls for
salvation, teaching of religious practice, and composition of prayers. 197
Even subjects on racism, anorexia, and bulimia consisted of lengthy
dissertations of biblical texts and concluded with religious messages
imploring salvation through God.198 Even the most staunch religious
accommodationist would have had trouble articulating secular bene-
fits to the University from this publication. The revelation of the mag-
azine's religious nature would never have withstood Madison's,
Jefferson's or the Court's Establishment Clause analysis. The Court
effectively overlooked this issue in order to reach the opinion it de-
sired, and effectively carved out another exception to the Establish-
ment Clause.
It may be countered that the Court's lack of attention to this issue
was not driven by a desire to escape the conclusion that Wide Awake
really was a religious activity. The real reason may have been based
on the potential procedural and administrative problems that would
be faced by universities had the Court decided a student could de-
mand a pro rata return of his or her mandatory student fee. Unfortu-
nately, this argument fails because it was previously settled in Keller
that "[w]hile such a procedure would likely result in some additional
administrative burden to [an organization] and perhaps prove at times
to be somewhat inconvenient, such additional burden or inconven-
ience is hardly sufficient to justify contravention of the constitutional
mandate."'199 Under this reasoning, universities would have to modify
their existing systems for disbursement of funds. They could not use
this administrative burden excuse to circumvent the Constitution.
C. An Aversion to Lemon - A Sour Note
One of the most disturbing aspects of the Rosenberger opinion
was the Court's unwillingness to apply the Lemon test to its Establish-
ment Clause analysis.2 °° The Court relied heavily upon Lamb's
Chapel as an analogous case in its analysis of Rosenberger.201 It is
197. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2534-35 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor did not
share the opinion of her colleagues that Wide Awake was not a Christian newspaper, in her
concurring opinion she asserted "[i]t is equally clear that [WAP's] viewpoint is religious and that
publication of Wide Awake is a religious activity, under both the University's regulations and a
fair reading of our precedents." ld. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198. ld. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
199. Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990).
200. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
201. Ld. at 2521-24. "[T]he most recent and opposite case is our decision in Lamb's Chapel
...." Id. at 2517.
1996]
23
Bycroft: Ready--Aim--Fire--The Supreme Court Continues Its Assault on the
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ironic that Lamb's Chapel reaffirmed the position that Lemon was still
the appropriate means for analyzing Establishment Clause cases.202
Regardless of how many Justices may have "personally driven pencils
through the creature's heart, '20 3 the Lemon test has yet to be
overruled.2 o4
The reasoning behind the Court's hesitancy to apply Lemon be-
comes apparent with an analysis of this test, specifically focusing on
excessive entanglement. If the Court had been forced to analyze the
"excessive entanglement" issue in Rosenberger, it would have had to
begin by scrutinizing the specific nature of Wide Awake. As previ-
ously discussed, the Court would have concluded that Wide Awake
was a religious activity devoted strictly to evangelism.0 5 This would
have resulted in direct funding of a religious activity by a state entity,
in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court could not have
justified its opinion with this conclusion, so by ignoring the Lemon
test, the Court effectively prejudiced the decision it sought to obtain.
It has been argued that the Lemon test "was never designed to
deal with free expression questions," so its absence from Rosenberger
was correct.20 6 This argument fails to encompass the bilateral nature
of First Amendment religion cases. Once a court determines there
has been an abridgment of a free-speech right in cases dealing with
religion, the next step is to determine whether the abridgment was jus-
tified in compliance with the Establishment Clause; even the majority
in Rosenberger acknowledged this.207 As was previously stated, the
recognized standard used by the Court in analyzing Establishment
Clause concerns is the Lemon test.203 The Court's avoidance of this
202. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 n.7 (1993).
203. IL at 2150 (Scalia, J., concurring).
204. Id at 2148 n.7.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
206. See Ralph D. Mawdsley and Charles J. Russo, Religion in Public Education: Rosenber-
ger Fuels an Ongoing Debate, 103 WELR 13 (1995).
207. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2520 ("It remains to be considered whether the violation
following from the University's action is excused by the necessity of complying with the Consti-
tution's prohibition against state establishment of religion."). Id.
208. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 n.7 ("[W]e return to the reality that there is a
proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon, however frightening it might be to some,
has not been overruled."); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) ("As in previous cases
involving facial challenges on Establishment Clause grounds... we assess the constitutionality of
an enactment by reference to the three factors first articulated in Lemon .... "); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Lemon ... identifies standards that
have proved useful in analyzing case after case both in our decisions and in those of other courts.
It is the only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted"); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 394 (1983) ("The general nature of our inquiry in [the Establishment Clause] area has been
guided, since the decision in Lemon... by the 'three-part' test laid down in that case .... ").
[Vol. 31:533
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss3/9
ROSENBERGER v. RECTOR
test only accentuates its continued attempt to circumvent the Estab-
lishment Clause mandate in order to accommodate religion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court appears to be on a mission to dissolve the barriers be-
tween church and state. The Court's erroneous rationalization that
the mandatory student fee was not equivalent to a direct tax may open
the door for more direct subsidization of religion and religious activi-
ties. Furthermore, the Court's unwillingness to provide students with
a means of return for his or her mandatory fee which was used to
support religious activities accentuates the Court's desire to force stu-
dents to pay for religious proselytization. Finally, the apparent demise
of the Lemon test will result in a more lenient standard in determining
what governmental activities violate the Establishment Clause.
With a current conservative majority on the Court favoring the
accomodationists' views, it is unlikely much will change in the near
future. With carefully written opinions crafting exceptions to the Es-
tablishment Clause, the Court appears determined to break down the
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